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Editorial
Protecting investments in polio eradication: the past, present and
future of surveillance for acute ﬂaccid paralysis
In September 2003 a WHO consultation group on vaccine-
derived polioviruses (VDPV) concluded that in order to
prevent future generations of paralytic polio after interrup-
tion of transmission of wild poliovirus, the use of trivalent
oral polio vaccine (OPV) must be stopped [1]. Another
important global policy decision along the road to polio
eradication thus became possible – cessation of OPV use
at some time after eradication. The question now is not
whether OPV must be stopped, but rather when.
The evidence underpinning the decision to stop OPV use
came from a complete review of the data from three well-
studied outbreaks of circulating VDPV (cVPDV) known
to have occurred since 1999 (Hispaniola, Philippines and
Madagascar) and one that was thought to have begun in
Egypt in 1988 and was identiﬁed retrospectively through
testing of stored poliovirus isolates.
These cVDPV outbreaks were identiﬁed by the inter-
national system of surveillance for acute ﬂaccid paralysis
(AFP) among children less than 15 years of age, a technical
and ﬁnancial investment of the polio partnership. Once re-
ported, each child with AFP is investigated and two faecal
samples are collected, 24–48 h apart, and within 14 days of
onset of paralysis [2]. Faecal samples are then sent under
cold conditions to WHO-accredited virology laboratories
where they are analysed in cell culture for isolation of
poliovirus, with subsequent sequencing of the VP1 section
of the genome as appropriate.
The AFP surveillance system links poliovirus isolates
to speciﬁc individuals, and is usually followed by a more in-
tense investigation of thoseAFP cases and communities from
whom wild or vaccine-derived poliovirus has been isolated.
Conﬁrmed polio virus triggers a massive immunization res-
ponse using OPV, and the surveillance system is constantly
monitored for performance using as standards the capacity
to detect at least 1 AFP case for every 100 000 children less
than 15 years of age; the collection of adequate faecal spe-
cimens from at least 80%of these AFP cases; and processing
of 100% of these specimens in a WHO-certiﬁed laboratory.
In 2000, the AFP surveillance system identiﬁed a polio
outbreak in Hispaniola just over 10 years after the island
had become polio-free. Genetic sequencing of the puta-
tive type 1 virus from the 21 conﬁrmed cases (13 in the
Dominican Republic, 8 in Haiti) suggested that all cases
were derived from a single OPV dose, estimated to have
been given in late 1998 or early 1999 [3]. All isolates from
the Dominican Republic outbreak were recombinants with
a common recombination region (VP2A), although each had
additional recombination events in other non-capsid regions.
The degree of sequence similarity of the outbreak virus with
Sabin poliovirus type 1 was lower than observed in isolates
from cases of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis
(VAPP), and the sequencing results suggested that the out-
break in the Dominican Republic began with the import-
ation of VDPV from Haiti. Within Haiti it appears that the
outbreak was caused by four separate type 1 viral lineages.
In 2001 the AFP surveillance system identiﬁed a polio
outbreak in the Philippines. Genetic sequencing conﬁrmed
that isolates from three cases were closely related to type 1
Sabin strain, but even more closely to each other sharing
a common recombination site (VP2B) [4]. The three cases
occurred in geographically separate communities, and
sequence similarities suggested that the virus had spread in
a single chain. Based on the lack of sequence divergence
among the isolates and the lack of detection of viral ances-
tors through the functional AFP surveillance system, it was
thought that the virus may have been imported, though no
similar virus was identiﬁed by the AFP surveillance system
elsewhere in the world.
In 2001 AFP surveillance again identiﬁed a cVDPV out-
break, this time in Madagascar [5]. The outbreak continued
into 2002, with ﬁve cases caused by a type 2 virus, and poss-
ibly two geographically separate lineages of independent
origin. Finally, a type 2 VDPV outbreak that occurred in
Egypt from 1988 to 1993was identiﬁed through theAFP sur-
veillance system and retrospective sequencing of virus strains
that had been stored in an Egyptian laboratory [6]. Sequen-
cing data suggested that VDPV circulation began in Egypt
with an OPV dose given sometime between 1979 and 1986.
The risk of cVDPV will remain as long as OPV use con-
tinues. International AFP surveillance must, therefore, be
maintained through cessation of OPV use in order to ensure
identiﬁcation of any outbreaks of cVDPV should they oc-
cur. At the same time OPV coverage must be maintained as
high as possible : the circulation of VDPV in all four cVDPV
outbreaks occurred in areas with low OPV coverage (20–
30% in the Dominican Republic, 7–30% in Haiti,<50% in
Madagascar, and in areas with inconsistent coverage in the
Philippines caused by vaccine shortages).
As planning for OPV cessation continues, considerations
other than maintenance of AFP surveillance and high OPV
immunization coverage also arise. Global policies for coordi-
nated cessation of OPV, for example, must be developed.
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Countries that decide not to continue immunizing against
polio after cessation must be assured that there is an inter-
national vaccine stockpile and response mechanism should
poliovirus be released from a laboratory or manufacturing
facility, as occurred during the 1990s [7]. Likewise, the risk
of polio virus re-entering human populations must be mini-
mized through destruction, or consolidation of potential or
known poliovirus-containing samples under secure storage
conditions, and ensuring safe manufacture of polio vaccine
that requires use of live poliovirus [8, 9].
Three billion US dollars will have been invested by the
polio eradication partnership by the end of 2005. With the
increased government commitment of the remaining polio-
endemic countries during early 2004, demonstrated by the
signing of the Geneva Declaration, polio eradication now
appears to be within sight [10]. The international AFP sur-
veillance system which began in the mid-1980s has been one
of the beneﬁciaries of the investment in polio eradication.
This investment has permitted not only the interruption
of wild poliovirus transmission, but has also identiﬁed a
major risk to polio eradication – VDPV – and provided the
evidence needed to minimize this risk. With the cessation
of OPV use and certiﬁcation of polio eradication, this uni-
que global surveillance system will no longer be required in
its present form. The opportunity to broaden it to encom-
pass other viral diseases such as yellow fever, measles and
inﬂuenza must not be missed.
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